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COMPARATIVE CONFLICT RESOLUTION PROCEDURES IN TAXATION. 
Edited by L. Hart Wright. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan 
Law School. 1968. Pp. xx.v, 468. $10. 
Review I 
Any workable tax system must include mechanisms for resolving 
the uncertainties and disputes which inevitably arise in the opera-
tion of the system. In the nature of things, those who establish the 
governing statutory structure can foresee only a small part of the 
total universe of transactions, plans, and events to which the law 
will ultimately apply; and even if they could anticipate all of the 
questions, the statute would hardly afford them an appropriate ve-
hicle for all of the answers. Necessarily, then, interpretative prob-
lems will occur. How does the law apply to classes of activities for 
which it makes no explicit provision? What are the tax consequences 
of transactions which are subject to inconsistent or ambiguous stat-
utory mandates? 
The officials charged with the administration of the system need 
answers to these questions. So do the taxpayers affected by the system. 
When a tax.payer contemplates a transaction the desirability of which 
is heavily influenced by tax considerations, he may well want to know 
the position of the system's administrators before he proceeds. When 
the administrators seek to collect a tax from a person who believes 
that he does not owe it, the resultant controversy must be resolved, 
either within the administrative framework, or by an independent 
adjudicative body. 
The methods which the United States, Belgium, France, West 
Germany, Great Britain, and the Netherlands have developed to cope 
with problems like these are the subject of the recent Compara-
tive Gon-fiict Resolution Procedures in Taxation, by Professor L. 
Hart Wright in collaboration with a research associate and tax experts 
from each of the European nations included in the study. Written 
with care and sophistication, the work should be of use to a variety 
of persons concerned with tax.es: tax practitioners and business ad-
visors whose work brings them into contact with the European ad-
ministrative systems described, parties in and out of the Government 
who wish to refer to the experience of other countries to improve 
their own tax procedures, and participants in the establishment of 
new tax structures in emerging nations or elsewhere. 
Professor Wright has himself had a good deal to do with the prac-
tical operation of the machinery by which the United States tax sys-
tem resolves uncertainties and settles disputes. One· of the most ac-
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complished and best known of our tax educators, he has taught at the 
University of Michigan Law School for almost twenty-five years; and 
the alumni of his classes now form considerable parts of both the 
private tax bar and the legal staffs which represent the Govern-
ment in tax matters. If their analysis is not always clear and precise 
or their methodology not always ordered, the defect does not lie with 
their education in tax law. Professor Wright's books and articles have 
contributed to our understanding of such substantive subjects as the 
law of tax liens1 and the participation of domestic enterprises in Com-
mon Market dealings.2 Of greater importance for present purposes, 
Professor Wright has repeatedly advised the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice on matters of organization, training, and procedure; he pre-
pared the materials which the Service presently uses to train both 
its audit and its rulings personnel; and his work with the Service 
has left him intimat~ly familiar with its operations and its problems. 
When he discusses tax administration, then, one does well to listen. 
Characteristically, Professor Wright's direction of the preparation 
of Comparative Conflict Resolution Procedures has brought meticu-
lous organization to the work. Separate sections of the book describe 
the procedures by which tax disputes are resolved in each of the six 
nations covered by the study. Each section explains (I) the adminis-
trative rule-making system of the country under consideration, (2) the 
country's procedures for assessment, refund, and administrative ap-
peal, and (3) the function of the country's independent tribunals in 
the decision of contested issues. Professor Wright draws the material 
together in an extended initial section which provides an exposition 
of the United States' procedures, compares them with those of the 
other nations, and outlines his own views on the ideal approach to 
each problem. 
The fundamental tripartite division of the subject matter of the 
book lends itself naturally to separate review of each of the work's 
three major areas of coverage. This Review limits itself to the treat-
ment of administrative rule-making. 
The over-all theme of Professor Wright's discussion of this subject 
is the necessity, in any relatively complex tax system, of a centrally 
administered interpretative program. In the United States, the Trea-
sury Department and the National Office of the Internal Revenue 
Service perform this function through the promulgation of regula-
tions, the publication of generally applicable rulings, the issuance of 
private rulings, and the provision of technical advice to the Service's 
field offices. With the proposition that these programs have been of 
1. See, e.g., T. PLUMB & L. HART WRIGHT, FEDERAL TAX LIENS (2d ed. 1967); Wright, 
Michigan Title Examinations and the 1954 Revenue Code's New General Lien Pro-
visions, 53 MICH. L. REY. 393 (1955). 
2. See TAXATION, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE IN nm EUROPEAN COMMON MArucET: A 
LEGAL PROFILE ch. 11 (E. Stein &: T. Nicholson ed. 1960). 
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major advantage to the operation of the American system, few 
would be inclined to disagree. However, the use of these programs 
in this country has exposed some important problems, which Pro-
fessor Wright examines with insight and realism. 
A critical set of problems can, for example, arise from the rela-
tionship between the program of private rulings and that of pub-
lished rulings. The goals of the two programs are quite different. The 
essential aim of private rulings is to permit commercial dealings to 
go £award unimpeded by the absence, in the tax statute and other 
authorities, of clear and definite guides to the tax results of such 
dealings. Hence, willingness to come to grips with reasonably 
difficult issues is at least a desirable feature of a private-rulings pro-
gram, and promptness in responding to taxpayer inquiries is an es-
sential attribute of a successful one. If the administrative agency 
answers only the easy questions, its rulings will be of limited assistance 
to the business planner; and if it answers slowly, the rulings will 
frequently be of no assistance to a business world in which action 
often must be taken quickly or not at all. 
Published rulings, on the other hand, are designed to provide in-
formation to all taxpayers and to the field personnel of the agency 
charged with the administration of the nation's tax system. Such 
rulings explain the application of the statute and the regulations to 
situations which neither statute nor regulations treat specifically, 
but which have been demonstrated by experience to have im-
portance for a significant number of taxpayers. Because published 
rulings state positions which the agency intends to apply to all simi-
larly situated taxpayers, and because in practice it is often difficult for 
the agency to reverse a position adopted in a published ruling, it is 
crucial that these rulings be correct. Today's erroneous publication 
can too easily become tomorrow's major tax reform issue, capable of 
resolution, as a practical matter, only by legislative action. The 
long history of the United States' tax rulings reveals surprisingly 
few instances of such errors, particularly in light of the volume of 
rulings published each year; but the effects of the mistakes which have 
occurred have been exceedingly difficult to root out. An illustration 
of the difficulty is the 1920 ruling which held that premiums paid by 
an employer on group-term life insurance do not constitute income 
to the insured employees3-a holding which, despite partial correc-
tion by the Revenue Act of 1964,4 even now produces a revenue loss 
of 400 million dollars each year.5 Another example is the 1954 ruling 
3. O. 104, 2 CuM. BuLL. 88 (1920). 
4. !NT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 79, 
5. Statement of Joseph W. Barr, Secretary of the Treasury, in Hearings on the 
1969 Economic Report of the President before the Joint Economic Comm., 91st Cong., 
1st Sess. 8-44 (1969). 
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which passed favorably on industrial-development bonds6 and was 
not finally corrected by Congress until 1964 (again with exceptions).7 
Therefore, while it is useful to have rulings published as soon as pos-
sible after problem areas surface at the administrative level, the 
promptness so necessary to the success of the private-rulings program 
must, in the public-ruling program, take second place to soundness 
of result; and it must do so particularly when the issues are difficult. 
These differences in priority of aims between the private-rulings 
program and the published-rulings program can lead to serious dis-
tortions if the two programs are closely interrelated in operation. If 
private rulings are limited by the standards which govern public rul-
ings, delay in the issuance of at least some rulings necessarily results 
-and produces a slowing or a rechanneling of the very commercial 
processes which the private-rulings program is undertaken to free 
from ta.x impediment. Reluctance to resolve difficult issues may also 
ensue. Conversely, if rulings are published as quickly as they are is-
sued privately, without undergoing a thorough review beyond that 
required for private rulings and, in some instances, without awaiting 
the development of greater experience with the problem area, in-
correct rulings will be published and may become irretrievably in-
corporated in the interpretative system. 
Professor Wright's solution is strict separation of the objectives 
of the two programs, with the personnel responsible for each 
program instructed to adhere to the standards appropriate to their 
own program. It is a good solution, and perhaps the best that can be 
given in the abstract. Still, strong pressures to conjoin the two pro-
grams will persist, and strict separation will be a good deal more 
difficult to maintain in practice than it is to justify in theory. In the 
United States, members and committees of Congress have repeatedly 
taken the position that the published-rulings program should be 
used to police the private-rulings system by making public all sig-
nificant private rulings soon after they are issued to the particular 
taxpayers who have requested them.8 Again, those responsible for 
the published-rulings program may become subject to institutional 
pressures to increase their output. Because the major source of grist 
for publication will be the products of the private-rulings program, 
any such influence will inevitably tend to draw the publication pro-
gram closer to the private program-and make it increasingly subject 
6. Rev. Rule. 54-106, 1954-1 CUM, BULL. 28. 
7. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 103(c). 
8. See, e.g., Hearings Before the Senate Select Comm. on Investigation of the 
Bureau of Internal Revenue, 68th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 30-31, 56-57, 3630-61 (1924-
1925); S. REP. No. 27, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 229-34 (1926); Hearings on Administration 
of the Internal Revenue Laws Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Ways and 
Means, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 1340 (1953). 
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to the standards of the private program. Finally, even in the absence 
of these forces, persuasive argument can be made that what the ad-
ministrative agency does for the taxpayer who requests a private 
ruling, it should also do for all other taxpayers. Indeed, how else can 
one achieve the national uniformity upon which a sound tax system 
must be based? Yet if the agency accedes entirely to this argument, 
all private rulings will forthwith be published, and the objectives of 
one or the other program will have to be sacrificed.9 
In the last analysis, it is probably impossible to preserve perfect 
independence for the two programs. At least, such separation has not 
been achieved in the United States. As elsewhere in government-
and life-the final result will most likely be a compromise; and the 
agency responsible for the administration of the tax system will be 
doing well if it can establish the proper standards for each program 
and adhere to them with reasonable success in most cases. 
The ideal administrative rule-making system which Professor 
Wright suggests departs from present American practice in another 
respect. Professor Wright recommends that published rulings be 
adopted as the official interpretative position of the administrative 
agency only after they have been issued in proposed form and the 
public has been given an opportunity to comment on them. Pre-
sumably, this recommendation would make published rulings subject 
to much the same procedures as are now applied to regulations-
with a proposed draft published, the public allowed to submit ·writ-
ten comments within a specified period of time, a public hearing 
held if sufficient interest appears, and a final form adopted only after 
consideration of the public comments. 
The judgment of the Internal Revenue Service has so far been 
that the large volume of rulings processed for publication makes it 
unfeasible to solicit public comments before adoption. Neverthe-
less, Professor Wright can make a good case for his view. Particularly 
with issues which have not previously aroused wide-spread concern 
among taxpayers, a private ruling adverse to the taxpayer's interest 
may finally be published-and thereby made applicable to all tax-
payers-even though the Service has had the benefit of only a single 
party's presentation of the contrary view. The ruling will, of course, 
have been subjected to the Service's own analysis and review at 
several levels. Nonetheless, if those who represented the taxpayer in 
the original ruling application presented their case badly-or posed 
9. Perhaps the fact that one taxpayer applies for a ruling and the others do not 
is sufficient ground to justify at least a delay in the accomplishment of uniformity. The 
taxpayer who applies, after all, thereby provides evidence of the reality and immediacy 
of his need. Hence, it can be argued that the administrative agency is justified in post• 
poning publication-making the answer available to all those who did not ask for it-
until it has subjected the private ruling to rigorous review and, when necessary, de-
veloped a more thorough knowledge of the problem and its implications. 
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the issue in such a way that the Service's subsequent independent 
research does not reveal the true strength of the taxpayer's case-
the Service may reach the wrong result. Thereafter, with the result 
hardened into official Service policy by publication, other taxpayers, 
seeking to reverse the ruling, will be confronted with an uphill 
battle, no matter how well they present their case. They may finally 
prevail-through litigation if they are unable to convince the Ser-
vice itself of the error-but the going will have been difficult, time-
consuming, and expensive. If such trouble can be avoided by permit-
ting public comments on the issue before the Service has taken any 
official position, why not provide a mechanism for such comments? 
The argument in favor of the existing practice is that the 
publication program is helpful to a broad range of taxpayers 
in a number of ways. Since any general solicitation of public views 
on proposed rulings would divert a substantial share of the man-
power resources presently devoted to the program, the number of 
rulings which could be published in any given time would be dimin-
ished, and to that extent the public benefit from the program would 
be curtailed. It is also worth noting that, although the mechanism 
which Professor Wright suggests would establish a safeguard against 
anti-taxpayer errors by the Service, it would do nothing to reduce 
the number of pro-taxpayer errors. Presumably, advance notice of 
the rulings on group-term life insurance and industrial-development 
bonds would have evoked nothing but praise (or a studied silence) 
from the interested members of the public. If the Service must main-
tain an internal review machinery satisfactory to guard against 
mistakes in favor of taxpayers, why is not the same machinery ade-
quate protection against mistakes of the contrary variety? 
Plainly, proper resolution of the issue requires more precise data 
than the public, at least, now has about the impact which advance 
publication would have upon the two competing interests involved. 
By how much would the step diminish the flow of published rulings? 
Would that reduction be likely to apply to important rulings, or to 
those of marginal utility? How worthwhile would the protection 
provided by notice in fact be? Are there really a significant number 
of erroneous anti-taxpayer rulings which it could reasonably be ex-
pected to prevent? 
It would require no great ingenuity to develop some useful 
responses to these questions. The Service might even test the pro-
cedure on a limited basis with a sample group of its pending 
rulings. Perhaps a middle ground would afford the optimum so-
lution. The Service might, for example, provide notice only for 
selected rulings involving issues which are unusually difficult or of 
widespread interest. Such an approach might minimize the drain on 
the resources of the publication program and at the same time con-
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centrate the use of the advance-publication safeguard upon those 
areas most likely to profit from it. In any event, the idea of advance 
publication of at least certain types of rulings seems worth further 
exploration; and while the suggestion did not originate with Pro-
fessor Wright, his renewal of it and his persuasive argument in its 
behalf are to be commended. 
One aspect of Professor Wright's discussion of the American 
regulations program deserves comment. In his exposition of the 
treatment accorded regulations in our courts, Professor Wright 
outlines three rationales which have been employed to justify the 
grant of special weight to them: the contemporaneous-construction 
analysis, the re-enactment doctrine, and the argument that dis-
inclination to overturn a regulation ought to increase with its dur-
ation. The implication is that, unless one of these theories applies 
to a regulation, it will not be given special consideration by the 
courts. 
Such an approach would preclude a small, but important 
and highly useful group of regulations from receiving appro-
priate weight. Occasionally serious problems develop long after the 
enactment of a relevant statutory provision. They may result from 
the advent of new commercial practices; from efforts by taxpayers 
to plan around the statutory provision or to use it for purposes not 
originally intended; or from activities which existed when the statute 
was enacted, but which gained public prominence-and the attention 
of taxing authorities-only much later. For a variety of reasons, the 
rulings process may not be suitable for a comprehensive, principled 
resolution of these problems. When the policy underlying the original 
legislative action extends also to the new problems, and when the 
statutory implementation of that policy can be reasonably construed 
to deal with them, it would seem entirely proper for the Treasury 
Department and the Internal Revenue Service to exercise their ad-
ministrative authority to issue regulations on the matter. Recent 
examples of such situations include the revised and much expanded 
regulations adopted under section 482;10 the regulations proposed 
in 1968 on industrial-development bonds;11 and the comprehensive 
1967 revision of the regulations under the unrelated business in-
come tax12-which provided a systematic elaboration of the principles 
of that tax and explained their application to such activities of 
exempt organizations as publication advertising and trade shows.18 
In each of these cases, the regulations were based upon a thor-
10. T .D. 6952, 1968-1 CUM. BULL. 218. 
11. 33 Fed. Reg. 4950 (1968). As has been stated, these regulations were quickly 
superseded by new congressional action proceeding in the same direction. 
12. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, §§ 511-13. 
13. T.D. 6939, 1968-1 CUM. BULL. 274. 
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ough review of the policy considerations which led Congress to adopt 
the statutory provisions in question; in each, painstaking investi-
gation of the factual nature and background of the new problems 
preceded the drafting of the regulations; and in each case, the work 
was performed by a joint task force of specialists from the Internal 
Revenue Service and the Treasury Department, consulting with 
experts outside the Government. The two regulations which were 
ultimately promulgated were finalized only after extensive public 
commentary and hearings on proposed drafts; and in all three in-
stances the regulations had been reviewed and approved at a•num-
ber of levels in the Service and the Treasury Department which 
would not have been required to pass upon published rulings. Since 
these regulations succeeded by many years the legislative acts upon 
which they were grounded, they cannot claim the benefit of the 
contemporaneous-construction argument; and if they were to be 
challenged in the courts within a few years of adoption, neither the 
extended-duration nor re-enactment rationales would apply. Yet it 
would require no more than a realistic recognition of the proce-
dures by which they were developed and adopted-because of their 
formal status as regulations, rather than ad hoc rulings-to hold 
that these regulations are entitled to substantially more weight than 
rulings. And in fact the approach of the Supreme Court would seem 
to confirm that judgment.14 
Those familiar with the rule-making system of the Internal 
Revenue Service and the Treasury Department will find themselves 
quite at home with the ideal system which Professor Wright recom-
mends. The two systems are very much alike. As has been shmvn 
with respect to the proposal for advance publication of rulings of 
general application, there are some differences; but they are not 
major. The fundamental structure of the ideal system-and a good 
many of its details--come from American experience. Presumably 
all of this is as it should be. The configuration of the ideal un-
doubtedly stems from Professor Wright's independent evaluation of 
the problems, his general rejection of the approaches which have 
evolved in the European nations included in the study, and his 
conclusion that the United States' mechanisms are essentially the 
best. Still, one would like to know a bit more about the results 
which have followed from some of the approaches of other nations. 
If a centralized interpretative program is necessary to the operation 
of a complex tax system, how has Britain, with a tax statute almost 
as complex as our own, managed to avoid such a program altogether? 
What problems have resulted? How have they been met? Infor-
mation of this sort would surely be helpful to one who is attempting 
14. Helvering v. Reynolds, 313 U.S. 428 (1941); Helvering v. Wilshire Oil Co., 
808 U.S. 901 (1989); Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344 (1935). 
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to determine which is the best procedure, and it might also suggest 
possibilities for improving the United States' procedures. Gulliver, 
after all, finally understood the English only after a rather impressive 
series of foreign travels; and perhaps we could learn important les-
sons about our own system from the experiments of others with en-
tirely different systems. 
If one feels mild disappointment with Comparative Conflict 
Resolution Procedures on this score, however, it detracts very little 
from the over-all judgment of strong approval. The book represents 
an impressive undertaking, impressively carried out. Professor Wright 
and his co-authors deserve compliments on a careful, incisive, and 
thoroughly useful job. 
Review II 
Thomas A. Troyer, 
Member of the District of Columbia Bar 
and 
Arthur B. White, 
Special Assistant to the Chief Counsel, 
United States Internal Revenue Seroice1rs 
Professor Wright and five European colleagues have addressed 
themselves to a central question facing all governments founded on 
law and public opinion: how to provide their citizens with uni-
form, fair, inexpensive, readily available, and timely resolution of 
their disagreements on tax matters. As Professor Wright emphasizes, 
the structures and procedures of all organizations represent a trade-
off among these multiple criteria. 
The prevention and resolution of conflict is a salient problem of 
this country's Internal Revenue Service. Each year more than a 
million taxpayers are informed, after examination, that there have 
been deficiencies in their self-report of taxes. Only a small per-
centage of them take their cases to the appeals process, whether it be 
through administrative or judicial channels. Professor Wright has 
admirably analyzed the interplay, in the six counties studied, of the 
administrative and judicial methods for resolving such conflicts, 
and has described methods for preventing conflicts. He compre-
hensively discusses the major aspects relevant to preventing conflict 
15. Mr. White's views stated here are his own, and are not necessarily those of the 
Internal Revenue Service. 
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-the clarity of the law, a centralized interpretative unit, compre-
hensive regulations, publicly available rulings, and technical as-
sistance. But even these steps, he says, are not sufficient in a complex 
society to prevent conflict. 
In the United States we take many steps at the original ex-
amining level to "avoid" conflict: a thorough training program for 
examiners, to which Professor Wright has contributed more than 
any other single person; technical guidance provided to examiners 
on specific issues; a general directive that the examiner fully explain 
to the taxpayer both the reasons for the deficiency and the fact that 
he will be satisfied with substantial, not perfect, compliance; and 
the review process. But these steps will not prevent the appeal of all 
disputes, because the initial examining officer is not permitted to 
take litigation hazards into account in resolving disputes,1 and hence 
some questions cannot be settled at the examining level. However, 
the taxpayer is granted a right of appeal to the Appellate Division 
at which litigation hazards may be considered.2 Since there are 
thousands of examining officers, and since it is not possible to re-
view the large number of discretionary judgments made by those 
officers with the same time and care that is given to matters handled 
in the Appellate Division, it would be impractical to vest the ex-
amining officers with the discretionary authority to consider litiga-
tion hazards. 
The only common component in the six countries studied is the 
availability of an independent tribunal-a necessary institution, 
but, as Professor Wright ex.plains, one which can be costly and in-
efficient if the tribunal is forced to handle too many disputes. The 
authors state that Belgium, France, and Great Britain use indepen-
dent lay tribunals, but that in the first two countries these bodies 
are only advisory and can be bypassed. They state further that in 
Belgium and France, as in the United States, the regional office pro-
vides the highest level of administrative appeal. In Germany, how-
ever, according to the authors, the taxpayer has no administrative 
appeal and instead goes from the local examiner directly to a 
specialized, decentralized court; while the Netherlands provides 
specialized chambers within its regular court system. In the United 
States the taxpayer may choose to resolve his conflict through ad-
ministrative or judicial channels, or through a combination of both; 
and within each of these channels the taxpayer has a choice of 
avenues. In each country the design of the administrative and judi-
cial appeals systems has been influenced by tradition, geographical 
dispersion, and the calibre and integrity of officials; and in our own 
nation, the sheer number of taxpayers has had a significant influence 
as well. 
1. 26 C.F.R. 601.105(c)(5) (1970). 
2. 26 C.F.R. 601.106(£)(2) (1970). 
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There can be no single solution among all countries to the 
problem of achieving a proper balance between administrative and 
judicial methods of "conflict" resolution. Generally, the adminis-
trative route is cheaper, quicker, and better able to handle a large 
volume of cases. In addition, since the administrator, as Professor 
Wright emphasizes, is bound by his own regulations and rulings, 
and since the judges in most countries are not specialized, the ad-
ministrative route is also generally more consistent. On the other 
hand, the judicial route is generally seen as more independent. 
Nevertheless, in the United States, policy guidance, organizational 
separation of appeals from examining officers, the right of the Appel-
late Division's conferees to take into account the hazards of litiga-
tion, supervision, review, and easy access to the judicial process help 
to ensure both an independent review by existing appeals officials 
and the responsiveness of such officials to judicial interpretations. 
Professor Wright feels that an appeals official would be even more 
responsive to judicial interpretation if he were required to try his 
own cases before the judiciary. But there is another side to this 
argument. An official who must try the case might be tempted to 
yield in order to avoid a potential "loss" in court, whereas a purely 
administrative official might in some cases be less willing to com-
promise and more willing to go to court to clarify the issue. In 
addition, a purely administrative official knows that in many cases 
there will be no appeal to the judiciary. In any event, the Amer-
ican experience suggests that the separate administrative process has 
proved responsive, as is evidenced by the relatively few cases that 
go through any channel of appeal, and the far fewer cases that 
are tried in court. Indeed, the size and rate of agreement of the 
nondocketed cases in the Appellate Division has increased over the 
past years, while the Division has continued to increase its acces-
sibility to the small taxpayer, who is less likely to carry his appeal 
to the judicial system. 
In summary, considering the complexity of tax law, the multi-
tude of factual situations, the thousands of examining officers, the 
amounts of money involved, and the relatively simple system for 
appeals, there will always be tax disputes moving "up the line." 
Professor Wright has charted a course for organizing a system to 
prevent and resolve those disputes. All tax administrators are in 
his debt. 
Donald W. Bacon, 
Assistant Commissioner (Compliance), 
United States Internal Revenue Service3 
3. The Michigan Law Review may be unique in asking an administrator to 
review a book analyzing his function. I assume that neither conflict of interest nor 
entrapment is involved. 
